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Compared to unmarried individuals married individuals report greater average wealth. A 
restricted focus on current marital status risks misrepresenting the effects of marriage on wealth, 
as an increasing proportion of older adults have been divorced and remarried, having lived 
through the dramatic upheavals in family structure from the 1960s through the 1980s. To shed 
light on the associations between a lifetime of marriage events and wealth near retirement, we 
used panel data from the Health and Retirement Study and developed categories of marital 
experiences that acknowledged current status, type, number and date of past marital disruptions 
and total duration of time spent married across the lifespan. We found that the route individuals 
took to get to their current marital status were important predictors of wealth levels near 
retirement and were different for males and females. Observable differences in lifetime earnings, 
mortality risk, risk aversion, other characteristics such as education and number of children, 
explained much of the wealth difference between married and remarried individuals however 
neither observable characteristics nor sources of other wealth from pensions and Social Security 
were enough to explain the large differences in wealth accumulation between single and married 
women and individuals experiencing more than one marital disruption. Given the higher divorce 
rate, prevalence of multiple divorces and earlier age of divorce of the Baby Boomer cohort 
compared to earlier cohorts, an understanding of how marriage disruptions over the lifecycle 













1.  Introduction 
Compared to unmarried individuals (i.e., never married, divorced, or widowed), 
married individuals report greater average wealth (e.g., Smith 1988).  There are several 
explanations for this empirical result.  First, economies of scale may lead to more 
consumption with lower expenditures for married couples compared to singles.  Second, 
the disruptions that stem from divorce or widowhood may result in unexpected expenses 
and lost income.  Third, the health benefits of being married may lead to lower mortality 
risk, and a consequently greater motive to accumulate wealth.  Although each of these 
explanations is distinct, they all make a common prediction about the effects of marital 
experiences on wealth in later life.  Through the accumulated consequences of a lifetime 
of marital states, individuals who have been continuously married should approach 
retirement with greater wealth than those who have never married or those who have 
experienced a marital disruption, i.e., a transition out of marriage through divorce, 
separation, or widowhood.   
Despite the plausibility of this prediction, the association between one’s lifetime 
history of marital events and wealth at retirement remains poorly understood, because 
most studies of consumption and savings of middle-aged and older individuals consider 
only current marital status (Gustman and Juster 1996).  This restricted focus risks 
misrepresenting the effects of marriage on wealth, as an increasing proportion of older 
adults have been divorced and remarried, having lived through the dramatic upheavals in 
family structure that took place from the late 1960s through the 1980s.  Understanding 
the economic security of individuals and families in and near retirement requires analyses 
that address not only current marital status, but also the collective impact of a lifetime of 
experiences with marriage, remarriage, divorce, and widowhood. Clarity about these 
associations has important implications for retirement savings incentives, public income 
support programs, and national savings rates.   
To shed light on the associations between a lifetime of marriage events and 
wealth near retirement, the current paper describes the following analyses.  First, using 
the Health and Retirement Study’s detailed information on multiple birth cohorts’ marital 
histories and dates of events, we develop categories of marital experience for respondents 
that acknowledge current status (divorce, widowhood, remarriage after widowing, 
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remarriage after divorce, continuous marriage, never married), as well marital histories, 
including number of marital shocks (e.g. 1 or 2 divorces), timing (e.g. age at first 
divorce), and total duration of time spent married across the lifespan.  We describe the 
diversity of marriage experiences of individuals age 51 to 56 and how this varies across 
birth cohorts.   
Second, we describe the relationship between marital history and wealth for the 
HRS, War Babies, and Early Baby Boomer birth cohorts using bivariate and multivariate 
methods.  The study of marriage types based on current status, previous marital shocks, 
the timing of those shocks, and duration in marriage has the potential to increase our 
understanding of the mechanisms through which marital experiences affect wealth.  For 
example, duration in a particular marital state would be important to the extent that there 
are returns to scale that produce higher levels of consumption for married couples.  In this 
way, sharing home ownership, which allows two people to live as cheaply as one, may 
reduce expenditures and increase savings while married.   
We model log wealth as a function of our marital history categories controlling 
for many permanent and transitory attributes of the individual and household that a 
lifecycle model of savings predicts affect wealth and that may vary by marriage state.  
For example, changes in marital status will alter permanent income, but it is also the case 
that low-income families are more likely to divorce or experience widowhood than high-
income families.  We address this type of selection by controlling for the lifetime 
earnings of individuals as well as current income and then interpret the effect of marital 
histories on wealth as independent of the effect of earnings and associated selection 
effects. The empirical model includes demographic characteristics and many other rich 
controls for likely sources of heterogeneity correlated with marriage, such as mortality 
risk, risk aversion, and time rate of preference.  In addition to our main model of total 
financial and housing wealth, we estimate separate models for financial and housing 
wealth and include controls for other sources of wealth in retirement from Social Security 
and pensions. 
We find that marital histories, that is, the route individuals take to get to their 
current status such as past marital disruptions and length spent married are important 
predictors of wealth levels near retirement and are different for males and females. 
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Consistent with a hypothesis of economies of scale, we find each year spent married 
increases wealth by 4 percent.  Women who experience a marital disruption between their 
mid 30’s and 40’s have 36 percent lower wealth than women who never experience a 
disruption or experience it at younger or older ages.   While, observable differences in 
lifetime earnings, mortality risk, risk aversion and time rate of preference, and other 
characteristics such as education and number of children explain much of the wealth 
difference between married individuals and those remarried after a widowing or divorce, 
neither these characteristics nor pension and Social Security wealth are enough to explain 
the large differences in wealth accumulation between continuously married individuals 
and individuals remarried after two or more marriage disruptions and single and married 
women.  Divorced women’s low level of financial literacy of divorced women may in 
part explain this groups’ low wealth levels.  The paper proceeds with a background 
section followed by methods, results, and a final conclusion. 
 
2.  Background.   
The standard model for analyzing saving decisions is the life-cycle model (LCM) 
of consumption (Modigliani and Brumberg, 1954).  According to this model, individuals 
and households choose a consumption path that will maximize lifetime utility.  An 
important prediction is that households will accumulate savings during their working life, 
and spend some of the savings to finance consumption following retirement.  Although 
the exact level of asset accumulation will depend on utility function parameters and the 
interest rate, it is illustrative to consider the case is when the parameters are such that the 
consumption path is flat as a function of age.  Then, in the absence of social programs 
such as Social Security and other forms of saving such as pensions, and holding the 
retirement age constant, an individual will save a fixed fraction of lifetime earnings.   In 
contrast to this prediction, however, the empirical literature finds that the savings of 
households with similar income levels can be very different. For example, in the Health 
and Retirement Study, median non-housing wealth among those with household income 
of $25-$50 thousand was $34 thousand, yet the 25th percentile was just $9.5 thousand 
and the 10th percentile just $1.2 thousand (Gustman and Juster, 1996).  Common 
explanations for the variation in wealth even among seemingly similar households 
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include other forms of retirement income such as pension and Social Security (Hubbard, 
Skinner, Zeldes 1996), differences in rate of time preference (Dynan 1993), and 
unexpected outcomes in earnings and expenses (Browning and Lusardi 1996).  To date, 
the potential influence of marital experiences has been largely overlooked.    
Studies that have considered the role of marriage offer several hypotheses to 
explain why experiences with marriage should affect wealth accumulation.  The first, 
based economic models of savings with no uncertainty and perfect capital markets, 
predicts consumption is determined by permanent income, thus an unexpected decrease 
in permanent income (e.g. from a widowing) would result in lower consumption and no 
change in savings.  Allowing for imperfect capital markets and imperfect foresight, 
however, implies an independent role for current income thus, a divorce or widowing 
accompanied by income loss may lead to dissaving rather than a reduction in 
consumption, particularly if it is seen as temporary. A second hypothesis is that married 
couples may consume many goods and services jointly (e.g. entertainment, housing) for 
the same cost as a single person, translating into additional wealth (or additional 
consumption).  Third, a marriage disruption may involve unexpected expenses such as 
legal expenses related to a divorce or health care expenditures related to the death of a 
spouse. Fourth, being married is associated with better health throughout the lifespan 
(Coombs, 1991; Pienta, Hayward, & Jenkins, 2000) and significantly greater longevity 
(Gove, 1973; House, Landis, & Umberson, 1988; Lillard and Waite, 1995); thus married 
couples may save more to protect against outliving their resources. In contrast to these 
hypotheses predicting married individuals will accumulate more wealth than singles, a 
fifth hypothesis predicts that marriage may lead to lower savings by reducing the risk 
associated with fluctuations in income (job loss, health shock), to the extent that 
insurance against future shocks is a motivation for savings (Mincer 1978). 
In addition to these frequently hypothesized associations, we add an additional 
hypothesis that we explore in the empirical work.  Financial literacy may vary by marital 
status.  For example, if one spouse (e.g husband) specializes in acquiring financial 
knowledge then upon divorce, the spouse who did not specialize (e.g. wife) will enter the 
unmarried state without this knowledge.  More generally, Lusardi and Mitchell (2007) 
find women, controlling for education have lower financial literacy than men.  While 
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consistent with this hypothesis, they do not specifically examine specialization within 
marriage in terms of financial decision-making.  
On the other hand, the association between marital experiences and wealth may 
not be entirely causal.  It may be the case that individuals that marry (or remarry) are 
different than individuals who never marry (or remarry) in terms of their time rate of 
preferences and risk aversion.  For example, risk averse individuals and those with a low 
discount rate on future consumption may be more likely to marry and remarry and save 
more.  Another sources of heterogeneity across marriage groups may be differences in 
number of children.   Married couples with children, compared to never married 
individuals without children, may choose to accumulate wealth in order to leave a 
bequest to children.  Alternatively they may give to adult children while they are alive to 
ease liquidity constraints (for example, for the purchase of a house or education), thereby 
lowering the wealth available for consumption during retirement.  More generally, 
expenditure on child-related commodities will increase with the number of children and 
the allocation of time to the labor market may decrease.  An often cited difference 
between married and unmarried individuals is earnings.  A substantial literature offers 
various ways that marriage may impact male earnings.  Marriage could motivate men to 
work harder (Becker, 1981), marriage might allow men to specialize in market work 
(Korenman and Neumark. 1991), or employers could favor married men over unmarried 
men (Hill, 1979).  Alternatively, it could be that men with strong labor market potential 
make more desirable marriage partners than men with weak labor market potential. In an 
effort to rule out this selection hypothesis, researchers have employed fixed-effect models 
and generally find a positive effect of marriage or no effect of marriage on male wages 
(Korenman and Neumark, 1991; Lundberg and Rose, 2002; Loughran and 
Zissimopoulos, 2007).  Considerably less attention has been paid to the effect of marriage 
on women’s earnings because of the strong correlation of marriage and childbearing.  
One exception is Loughran and Zissimopoulos (2007) and they find that marriage has a 
negative effect on the earnings of women independent of the effect of children. While 
income is a critical measure of well being, wealth (housing, financial assets, pension and 
Social Security wealth) is an important complementary measure and arguably the most 
important measure for older individuals because it represents resources available for 
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consumption in retirement.  Far less is empirically understood about the effect of 
marriage on wealth although theory suggests it is likely to be important.  
Two studies that use the HRS to move beyond comparisons between currently 
married and unmarried individuals and also address the relationship between wealth and 
marriage are Wilmoth and Koso (2002) and Lupton and Smith (2000).  Both studies 
confirm earlier findings that married adults have higher wealth than unmarried adults 
(Gustman & Juster, 1996; Smith, 1988; Seigel, 1993), although neither study controlled 
for permanent income and other measures likely to be correlated with marital status and 
wealth, such as risk aversion and mortality risk.  Wilmoth and Koso (2002) expanded the 
range of marital statuses being studied and classified remarriages separately from first 
marriages.  They found that remarriage partially offset the detrimental effects of a marital 
disruption but that continuously married couple still had more wealth in comparison.  
Lupton and Smith (2000) did not consider remarriage separate from continuous marriage 
but did examine length of marriage using the HRS and Panel Study of Income Dynamics 
and found a positive relationship between time spent married and wealth.   
In sum, there are many pathways through which marriage events over the 
lifecycle may affect wealth.  There are, however few empirical findings on marital 
history, timing of marriage events and duration in marriage to aid in establishing 
empirical facts and differentiating between possible explanations.  The strength of the 
relationship between marriage and wealth suggests its importance as an area for further 
study.  The contributions of this study are one, establishing empirical facts on the wealth 
differences by marital histories, duration of time spent married and age of marital 
disruption; two determining what types of wealth vary by these dimensions in marriage 
over the lifecycle (e.g. housing, financial, pension or Social Security) and three, 
analyzing which hypotheses about the association of marriage and wealth are consistent 
with the differences we see.  
 
3.  Methods 
Our data are from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS).  The HRS is a biennial 
panel that emphasizes retirement behavior and how it is affected by health status, 
economic status, and work incentives.  The HRS has a complete inventory of assets and 
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income, and these data appear to be of very high quality due to innovative survey 
techniques.  At baseline in 1992 the HRS had 12,652 respondents and was nationally 
representative of individuals born in 1931-1941 and their spouses, except for over-
samples of blacks, Hispanics, and Floridians.  This project uses data from survey wave 
1992 for the HRS birth cohort (1931-1941), 1998 for the War Babies birth cohort (1942 – 
1947) and 2004 for the Early Baby Boom birth cohort (1948-1953).  These cohorts are 
especially relevant to understanding the effects of marital history on health as they have 
experienced substantially higher divorce rates than previous cohorts and they are more 
likely to be entering older adulthood with a diverse history of marital experiences 
(Cherlin, 1992).  We exclude two birth cohorts, Children of the Depression Era birth 
cohort (1924 – 1930) and the AHEAD sample (born 1923 and earlier) because the ages at 
which they enter the sample are past normal retirement ages.  In addition, we use 
restricted data on Social Security earnings to compute a measure of lifetime earnings for 
all cohorts and for the HRS cohort, a measure of the present discounted value of Social 
Security wealth at age 62. For the HRS cohort only, we also use restricted, that is, not 
public use, data from respondents’ employers on pensions to construct a measure of 
present discounted pension wealth at age 62.  We use this measure and Social Security 
wealth as control variables in multivariate models of financial and housing wealth to test 
sensitivity of our marriage estimates to the inclusion of other wealth measures.  Marital 
history variables were derived based on the raw HRS files; most other variables used in 
the study are from the RAND HRS Data file, a longitudinal data set based on the HRS 
data and developed at RAND with funding from the National Institute on Aging and the 
Social Security Administration.  We discuss our measurement of the key variables of 
interest in this analysis and describe our estimation methods in the remaining paragraphs 
of this section.  
Marital History.  One goal of this study is to examine whether detailed 
assessments of individuals’ marital histories better illuminate the associations between 
marriage and wealth levels near retirement.  We create marital status categories based on 
current marital status, reports of type of past marriage dissolution (widow, divorce) and 
remarriages, and the number of these marital events to form ten mutually exclusive 
categories comprised of five married categories and five single categories.  The five 
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married categories are: continuously married (currently married and no past marital 
shocks), remarried after one divorce, remarried after one widowing, remarried after more 
than one shock (divorce or widowing), remarried after one unknown type of marriage 
shock (a separation occurred but the respondent did not respond if it was a divorce or 
widowing).  The five single categories are:  never married, divorced once, widowed once, 
divorce and/or widowed more than one time, one shock but of an unknown type 
(respondent did not respond if it was a divorce or widowing).  We group partners, not 
married but cohabitating couples, in with singles (1,144 respondents) and separated in 
with married respondents (822 respondents) and include categories for missing 
information on past marital shock type or date (217 respondents) and unknown current 
marital status (250 respondents).  
 To evaluate the different features of an individual’s marital history, we also 
calculate the total duration spent married across the lifespan and the timing of the first 
marital disruptions or shocks.  We classify age at first shock into the following 
categories:  age less than or equal to 25, ages 26 to 35, ages 36-45 and ages 46 and over.  
We split 20 years of prime earnings (and savings) years into those capturing years before 
savings has likely been initiated (before age 36) and years in which most households are 
accumulating wealth (Zissimopoulos and Hurd, 2003).   
Lifetime earnings.  Survey data are linked with Social Security earnings records. 
The earnings data for the HRS cohort are based on historical earnings from 1951-1991 
reported to the Social Security Administration and are available for 9,539 HRS 
respondents.1  Earnings data for the War Babies cohort are available for 1,330 
respondents from years 1951-1997 and for the Early Baby Boomers cohort are available 
for 1,620 respondents from years 1951-2003.   The administrative records are accurate 
and less subject to measurement error than self-reported earnings from household surveys 
and cover a long history of earnings, however they are also limited in two ways.  First, 
the level of earnings is reported only up to the Social Security maximum.  This maximum 
changed over time as did the number of individuals whose earning were above the 
                                                 
1 See Haider and Solon (2000) for a discussion of characteristics of individuals with and without matched 
Social Security records. 
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maximum.  Second, individuals employed in a sector not covered by Social Security have 
no earnings records for the years he or she is employed in the uncovered sector.2    
We use Social Security earnings to measure lifetime labor income.  Lifetime 
earnings are calculated as the present discounted value (3 percent real interest rate) of real 
Social Security earnings adjusted to 2004 dollars using the CPI-U-RS, and we adjust for 
the upper truncation of Social Security earnings.  We examine the relationship of Social 
Security earnings and wealth controlling for education to assess its relationship to wealth 
with the understanding that it may be a noisy measure of actual lifetime earnings.  We 
include in multivariate models of wealth this measure for each individual in the 
household in a log functional form.   
Mortality Risk, Risk Aversion, Time Rate of Preference.  Mortality risk is the 
respondent’s subjective survival assessment of living to age 75 on a zero to 100 scale and 
we include it in empirical models as a categorical variable:  zero, 1 to 49, 50 (reference 
group) 51 to 99 and 100. The measure of risk aversion is an indicator for being rated at 
the least and second-least risk averse levels in a four-point scale of risk aversion.  In other 
words, this is the group that is more tolerable of risk.  The basis for categorizing the level 
of risk aversion is a series of questions that ask the respondent to choose between pairs of 
jobs where one job guarantees current family income and the other offers the chance to 
increase income and carries the risk of loss of income.  We measure respondents’ time 
rate of preference by their responses to the length of time they use for financial planning.  
The answers are categorical from a few months to over ten or more years and included in 
the model as less than five years (reference groups), five to ten years and ten or more 
years. 
Wealth.  Our main outcome measure is wealth at year of entry into the survey for 
our three birth cohorts: 1992 for the HRS birth cohort (1931-1941), 1998 for the War 
Babies birth cohort (1942 – 1947), and 2004 for the Early Baby Boom birth cohort (1948-
1953).  Thus wealth is measures at ages 51-56 for all cohorts and through age 61 for the 
HRS cohort.  Total wealth is computed as the sum of wealth from real estate, businesses, 
IRAs, stocks, bonds, checking accounts, CDs, and housing, less the value of the 
mortgage, home loans, and other debt.  Missing data on wealth are imputed and the 
                                                 
2 In 1996, 92% of non-self-employed wage and salary workers were covered by Social Security.   
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methods are described in RAND HRS Version G. The main models include as a covariate 
an indicator for pension ownership and type (defined benefit, defined contribution, both, 
or none – the reference group).  In subsequent analyses of the HRS cohort, the present, 
discounted value of Social Security wealth and pension wealth at age 62 are included in 
models as covariates to control for substitution between financial and housing wealth and 
other wealth. Social Security wealth is computed as combined wealth for married couples 
and individual wealth for single individuals.  It is based on Social Security earnings data 
for respondents where the information is available and based on self-reported data 
otherwise.  Pension wealth is derived from the HRS Wave 1 Pension Plan Detail Data set 
for respondents who provided the names and addresses of their employers and HRS 
obtained the most recent Summary Plan Description.  Pension wealth estimation is based 
on the assumptions of a 6.3 percent interest rate, 5 percent wage growth rate and 4 
percent inflation rate which corresponds to the Social Securities ‘medium’ projection (in 
contrast to high or low projections).  For all other respondents, pension wealth is imputed 
based on the self-reported data.   
Multivariate Model.  We use linear regression methods to model log wealth.  For 
couples, household wealth is a per capita measure (divided by two) and as such, assumes 
no economies of scale in comparing the estimated effects of being singles and being 
married or remarried. The main covariates of interest are ten marriage categories (defined 
above), with continuously married as the reference group and included as gender specific 
variables. Also included is a continuous variable for total years married, and five 
categories of age at first separation (ages 26-35 excluded).  Log lifetime earnings are 
included for males and females separately.  Other individual level variables included as 
gender specific variables are mortality risk, risk aversion, race as an indicator for black, 
indicators for the highest educational degree achieved include: none; high school or GED 
(reference group); some college; bachelor’s, master’s and Ph.D., J.D., M.D. degrees. 
Household variables include number of children categorized as none, one to three 
(reference group), four or more; pension ownership and type. We estimate the model 
pooled over all birth cohorts, and by birth cohort, for total wealth and financial and 
housing wealth separately.We check the sensitivity of the main results to the exclusion of 
Social Security and pension wealth by estimating the main model and including the 
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expected, discounted value of pension wealth at age 62 and Social Security wealth at age 
62.   
 
4.  Results 
 We first describe the distribution of marital status types taking into account 
current marital status, type of past marital disruption (divorce or widowing) and number 
of disruptions, the length of years spent married, and the age of the first marital 
disruption (if any).  We analyze wealth by these measures of marriage and examine 
lifetime and current income differences across marriage groups.  Next we estimate 
multivariate models of wealth levels near retirement as function of our marriage variables 
of interest and a rich set of control variables.  Finally, we explore financial literacy as an 
explanation for the large wealth difference we see for women across marital groups and 
the sensitivity of our estimation results to the inclusion of Social Security and pension 
wealth. 
Current Marital Status and Marital History.  Table 1 shows the distribution of 
current marital status, number of previous divorces (and average number), age of first 
marital disruption (and average age) and years married (and average number of years) for 
the three birth cohorts separately and together holding age constant at ages 51-56.  Only 
about half of marriages are first marriages and more so for the HRS cohort (55.5 percent) 
than for the War Babies (52.9 percent) and EBB cohort (45.2 percent).  Remarriage rates 
are high at 21.7 percent and about equal for all cohorts.  The large difference in 
continuously married rates between HRS and EBB cohorts is primarily due to the 
difference in divorce rates (11.4 percent for HRS and 17.5 percent for EBB) and to a 
smaller extent, percent never married.  The EBB cohort is also more likely to have two or 
more divorces (11.8 percent) than WB (8.9 percent) or HRS (7.3 percent) cohorts.  
Among respondents age 51 to 56 that experienced a marriage separation (divorce or 
widowing), about 35 percent experience the first shock at ages 26 to 35 and the average 
age is 34. There is an interesting cohort difference with the EBB cohort more likely to 
experience the shock at younger ages compared to the WB and HRS cohorts.  For 
example, among those that experience a shock, 26.8 percent of EBB cohort experienced 
the shock age 25 or younger while this percentage is 19.6 for the HRS and 22.6 for the 
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WB cohorts.  In addition to the greater likelihood of experiencing a shock at a young age, 
the Early Boomers, by ages 51 to 56, have been married on average 24.8 years compared 
to 28.5 years for the HRS cohort at the same ages.  Moreover, 16.9 percent of the EBB 
cohort had marriages lasting less than 10 years while this percentage is only 7.4 for the 
HRS cohort and 11.8 for the WB cohort.   
Table 2 combines current marital status with past marital events for all cohorts 
ages 51 to 61 to yield ten mutually exclusive categories and two categories of missing 
marriage shock type.  These are the categories that enter our model for wealth (by 
gender).  Like Table 1, Table 2 shows the diversity of marriage experiences of older 
adults.  Among respondents age 51 to 56, 16.3 percent are remarried after divorce while 
another 9 percent never remarried after divorce.  About equal percentages of respondents 
remarry after multiple shocks as stay single (5.6 versus 5.3 percent respectively).  Few in 
this age range are widowed.  About 2 percent are remarried widows and about 3 percent 
are single widows.  The most striking difference between men and women (results not 
shown in Tables) is that men are more likely to be continuously married than women 
(56.8 vs. 49.6 percent respectively) and remarried after one divorce (19.0 vs. 13.6 percent 
respectively). In sum, the results shown in Tables 1 and 2 reveal that the marriage 
experiences of individuals age 51-56 are very diverse with less than half of all individuals 
experiencing one continuous marriage.  Moreover, in successive birth cohorts, divorces 
tend to occur at younger ages and are less likely to be followed by remarriage.   
Wealth and Marital Status, Duration and Timing of Disruptions.  The top panel of 
Table 3 shows median wealth for three cohorts ages 51-56 by the 10 marriage categories.  
Given that the measure of wealth is household wealth, and a couple will need finance the 
consumption of at least two people in retirement, it is not surprising that married couples 
have more wealth than singles, but the magnitude of the difference is nevertheless 
striking.  Married couples have almost 4 times the wealth as singles, and close to 5 times 
the wealth among the EBB cohort.  Examining mean wealth (bottom panel in Table 3) we 
see that couples have about 2.5 times more wealth than singles and closer to 3 times more 
wealth among the EBB cohort.  All else being equal, it is difficult to assess what an 
equivalent amount of wealth for a single person should be relative to a married person.  
While we have widely used measures of household income based on equivalence scales, 
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no single accepted measure for wealth exists.  Because of economies of scale, we would 
expect couples to have less than two times more wealth than singles.  
Among the singles, median wealth amounts vary by which cohort we examine.  
Among the HRS, for example, never married (no past shock), divorced (one time) and 
widowed (one time) have about the same level of wealth at the median (e.g. 
approximately $40,000) and individuals experiencing more than one marital disruption 
have less wealth at the median (approximately $29,000).  Among the War Babies and 
Early Baby Boomer singles, it is both the never married and multiple event singles that 
hold less wealth than the divorced and widowed.  Among the EBB, however there is 
much less difference in wealth levels among the categories of singles than among the 
War Babies singles.  Among married couples, continuously married couples hold more 
wealth than remarried couples.  For example, HRS couples remarried after divorce have 
about 75 percent the wealth that continuously married couples have and EBB couples 
remarried after divorce have about 60 percent the wealth that continuously married 
couples have.  The lower wealth levels are consistent with marriage disruptions involving 
unexpected expenses large enough that increased savings does not compensate for them. 
It is also the case that remarried couples have fewer years of total marriage and thus less 
time to benefit from economies of scale.  In sum, generally we see that continuously 
married couples hold the greatest amount of wealth, even more than remarried couples, 
and singles experiencing more than one marital disruption have the lowest amount. 
If marriage leads to higher wealth due to economies of scale, then more years 
spent married should be associated with higher levels of wealth (all else being equal). 
Table 4 shows median wealth by age of first marital disruption and by duration of 
marriage.  The top panel is for a sample of currently married individuals and the bottom 
panel if for currently single individuals. Among remarried couples, there is little 
difference by age at which the disruption occurred.  In contrast, among singles, age of 
disruption is positively associated with median wealth levels.  That is, the later the age of 
disruption, the higher the wealth level at the median. Both married and singles with 10 
years of marriage or more have about two times the amount of median wealth as those 
with less than 10 years of marriage. 
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 Lifetime Earnings and Marriage Events.  One central explanation for the large 
differences in wealth levels near retirement by marital status and marital history may be 
differences in permanent earnings, whether it be the case that marriage causes higher 
earnings or that higher ability people are more likely to marry (and remarry) and less 
likely to divorce.  Table 5 shows mean lifetime earnings and current earnings for males 
and females by current marital status and marriage history.  Among married males, there 
only a small difference in lifetime earnings for those continuously married and those who 
remarry after a single divorce or widowing.  For example, men who remarried after a 
divorce have about $980,000 in lifetime earnings, while continuously married men have 
just over one million dollars in lifetime earnings.  The mere $24,000 difference in 
lifetime earnings does not explain all of the $60,000 difference in mean wealth between 
remarried and continuously married men.  Remarried males with two or more past 
disruptions have about $140,000 less lifetime earnings than continuously married males, 
which could explain much of the wealth differences between this group and the 
continuously married group.  On average, single men have lower lifetime earnings than 
married men.  Among single men, the most outstanding difference in lifetime earnings is 
for never married men, who have only $600,000 in lifetime earnings compared to over 
$840,000 in lifetime earnings for divorced men.  Lifetime earnings among singles women 
compared to married women are much different then men.  Single women have higher 
lifetime earnings than married women, never married women having the highest earnings 
(approximately $560,000) and remarried women have higher lifetime earnings than 
continuously married women.  These patterns are consistent with lower labor force 
participation of married women relative to single women.  The pattern for current 
earnings is similar.  Continuously married men (women) have similar earnings as men 
(women) remarried after a divorce.  Earnings for widows are lower likely reflecting older 
ages.  Single men have lower earnings than married men, and single women have higher 
earnings than married women, consistent with prior research on this topic.  In sum, while 
lifetime earnings and current earnings are likely important factors in wealth differences 
between married and unmarried individuals, they are unlikely to explain more than a 
small part of the wealth differences between continuously married and remarried men and 
women.     
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 Multivariate Model Results.  Frequency distributions of the categorical covariates 
included in the multivariate linear regression models of log wealth are provided in the 
Appendix Table by marriage categories and for all. The first column of Table 6 shows 
estimation results for total non-pension and Social Security wealth, the second column 
shows results for non-housing wealth, and the third column shows results for housing 
wealth.  For couples, wealth is a per capita measure (assuming a household of two 
persons).  Thus, the measure assumes no economies of scale and likely any remaining 
difference in wealth between married and single individuals (after controlling for other 
differences) is likely understated.  Our covariates of interest are the 10 marriage 
categories (based on current status and past events), with continuously married as the 
reference group, the number of total years spent in the married state, and the five age at 
first separation categories (ages 26-35 excluded).  All these variables are included 
separately for males and females.  Also included for males and females separately are log 
lifetime earnings, current earnings, mortality risk, risk aversion, race and education. 
Household variables include number of children, pension ownership and type and entry 
birth cohort.  We check the sensitivity of the results to the exclusion of pension wealth 
and Social Security wealth by estimating the main model for the HRS cohort and 
including as a covariate the expected, discounted value of pension wealth and Social 
Security wealth at age 62 (results from this model are not presented in the table but are 
discussed below).  
Current Marital Status and Past Marital Events   
The model estimates presented in Table 6 indicate that, for both men and women, 
the wealth differences between continuously married and remarried men and women 
disappear once we include our control variables.  An exception is that remarried men 
with two or more disruptions have 45 percent less wealth than continuously married 
couples and this is primarily due to much less housing wealth (column 3).  As the 
Appendix table shows, there are some differences between remarried men (women) and 
continuously married men (women) that in part explain the wealth differences we saw in 
Table 3.  Remarried men and women are less likely to have a college education or higher.  
In the models, higher education is associated with greater wealth, and one mechanism 
through which this may be operating (holding permanent and transitory income constant) 
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is financial literacy (Lusardi and Mitchell, 2007).  They are also more likely to have 4 or 
more children, which in the models is associated with lower wealth.  While the effect of 
children on assets is complicated, in terms of consumption, expenditure on child-related 
commodities will increase with the number of children and may also alter the allocation 
of time to the labor market.  Other covariates such as mortality risk, risk aversion, and 
financial planning horizon (our proxy for time rate of preference) are generally the same 
across continuously married and remarried groups with the exception that remarried men 
after a widowing report a lower probability of living to 75 and shorter financial planning 
horizon than other married men (consistent with holding less wealth) and remarried 
women after a widowing are the least risk averse and report a shorter financial planning 
horizon (consistent with holding less wealth). 
Using a per capita wealth measure as the outcome (assuming no economies of 
scale), we find that single men, with the exception of those experiencing two or more 
marital disruptions, have the same wealth levels as married men once we control for 
many other observable differences that vary by marital group such as lifetime earnings, 
mortality risk, risk aversion, financial planning horizon and other characteristics.  Still, 
this may translate to lower consumption in retirement than that of married men given we 
expect some economies of scale for married couples.  Single men with two or more 
marriage disruptions, however, have 70 percent less wealth than continuously married 
couples, primarily less housing wealth. All single women, have substantially lower 
wealth than married women.  For example, divorced women have 90 percent less wealth 
and widowed women have 68 percent less wealth.  One explanation for the gender 
differences we see (given we are controlling for lifetime earnings, current earnings, 
mortality risk and many other differences) is children most often reside with the mother 
when a marriage dissolves and the higher consumption needs of a household with 
children may not be fully compensated by alimony or child support payments.  To 
maintain consumption, the household may reduce savings.  Another explanation for the 
gender differences between single males and females we find may be differences by 
gender in financial literacy and we return to examining this explanation later.  Comparing 
the results in this table to the mean wealth results in Table 3 we see that difference in 
wealth levels between married and single individuals declines substantially.  Recall that 
 
 17
mean results revealed 2.5 times more wealth for married couples than singles.  However, 
even with income controls (measured with lifetime earnings and current earnings), 
controls for mortality risk, risk aversion and time rate or preference (measured by 
financial planning horizon), the effect of marriage (particularly for women) is large. 
Years Married and Age of Marital Disruption 
Each additional year spent married is associated with a 4 percent increase in total 
wealth for both men and women.  This is a substantial effect when you consider that the 
average number of years spent married for a continuously married couple is 30 years (26 
years for remarried couples) and only 16 years for a divorced individual.  The effect is 
slightly higher on housing wealth (5.7 and 5.3 percent for men and women respectively) 
than non-housing wealth (3.2 and 3.7 percent for men and women respectively), which is 
consistent with the hypothesis that marriage brings economies of scale in consumption.  
Age at which the first marriage disruption occurred has no effect on the total wealth of 
men but for men with a disruption at ages 46 and older, housing wealth is 100 percent 
lower compared to men that experienced a disruption between ages 26 and 35.  Among 
women total wealth is 37 percent lower if the marital disruption occurred between ages 
36 and 45 compared to a disruption between ages 26 and 35 and the lower wealth is 
primarily due to lower housing wealth.   
Other Predictors of Wealth 
Income, mortality risk, risk aversion and financial planning horizon (our proxy for 
time rate of preference) all have a significant effect on wealth levels near retirement in 
the expected direction.  A one percent increase in the lifetime earnings of men increases 
wealth by 0.40 percent and a one percent increase in the lifetime earnings of women 
increases wealth by 0.11 percent. The effect of a one percent increase in current earnings 
is substantial smaller than for lifetime earnings and is 0.03 percent for men and 0.04 
percent for women.  A high mortality risk (a zero subjective survival of living to 75) is 
associated with substantially lower wealth levels (81.8 and 93.6 percent less wealth for 
men and women respectively) and a high tolerance for risk is associated with 29 percent 
less wealth for men relative to being the most risk averse.  We interpret the financial 
planning horizon as a proxy for time rate of preference and find that as the horizon 
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increases, so does wealth.  Finally, as noted earlier, high education (college or more) is 
associated with more wealth and children with less wealth.   
Pension and Social Security Wealth 
Our measure of wealth (housing and non-housing) is somewhat narrow in that it 
does not include future claims on pension and Social Security wealth that may vary by 
current marital status and past marital events.  For example, previously married single 
individuals are entitled to spousal Social Security benefits if their prior marriage lasted 
more than 10 years.  Table 7 shows mean values of the present, discounted value of 
Social Security wealth and pension wealth as of age 62 and mean value of housing and 
financial wealth for the HRS cohort (all in $2004).   Mean Social Security wealth is about 
2 times higher for married males than single males and about 2.5 times higher for married 
women than single women.  Social Security wealth is lowest for widowed females.  
Compared to housing and non-housing wealth, Social Security wealth is more important 
for singles than married individuals.  For example, continuously married males have 
mean housing and non-housing wealth that is almost 2 times their Social Security wealth; 
while for divorced males, mean housing and non-housing wealth is about 1.5 times more 
than their mean Social Security wealth.  Adding in pension wealth we find that for 
continuously married men housing and financial wealth is about 0.8 pension plus Social 
Security wealth; while for divorced men, Social Security and pension wealth is almost 2 
times the mean amount of housing and financial wealth.  For divorced women, Social 
Security and pension wealth is just over 2 times the mean housing and financial wealth.  
In sum, once we consider Social Security and pension wealth, the mean wealth 
differences between married and single respondents decrease. We check the sensitivity of 
our estimates of our marriage covariates of interest in Table 6 to the inclusion of controls 
for Social Security wealth and pension wealth. Among women in the HRS birth cohort, 
we find the negative effect on wealth of being single (all types of singles) compared to 
being married declines but is still substantial.   For example, the coefficient on never 
married declines from an estimated coefficient of -1.6 to -0.91.   The average decline in 
the difference in wealth between continuously married females and all categories of 
singles once we control for Social Security and pension wealth is 24 percent.  No other 
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estimates of marriage categories change substantially with the inclusion of these 
measures (results not shown).   
Financial Literacy 
One explanation for the large wealth differences of single women compared to 
married women even with rich controls for observable differences is differences in 
financial literacy.  This may be particularly important for previously married women 
(compared to never married women) who may not have invested in understanding 
complex financial decisions while married if the husband, and not the wife, specialized in 
financial decision-making.  While financial literacy has been shown to vary substantial 
with education (Lusardi and Mitchell, 2007), which is included as a control variable in 
our models, if it is the case that spouses specialize, then controlling for education, we 
would expect a difference in financial literacy by marriage category.  Fortunately in the 
2004 wave of the HRS, the Early Baby Boomer cohort was asked three questions geared 
toward assessing their financial literacy.  We examine the third question that was 
designed to elicit ability to make complex financial decisions.  Table 8 shows the 
financial literacy question that was asked and the percent of correct responses among 
college graduates (on average, less than 10 percent of non-college graduates answered the 
question correctly). We find that the percent of respondents who answered the question 
correctly is much lower for divorced men and women with only 14 percent of divorced 
women answering the question correctly.  In contrast, 23 percent of never married 
women answered the question correctly. Data collection efforts that focus on financial 
decision making within the household and financial literacy over the lifecycle may shed 
light on some of the marriage differences we see.   
5.  Conclusion 
This study expands our understanding of how marriage and wealth are related by 
analyzing a lifetime of marriage events, the timing of marriage events and duration of 
years spent married, and by examining a rich set of covariates that a lifecycle model of 
savings predicts will affect wealth and that may vary by marriage including lifetime 
earnings and current earnings, education, mortality risk, risk aversion, time rate of 
preference, children and other demographics.  We find that the lifetime marriage 
experiences of individuals nearing retirement are very diverse:  less than half of all 
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individuals experience one continuous marriage throughout their lives.  Moreover, 
successive birth cohorts are at greater risk of experiencing on or more divorces, 
experience them at younger ages, and are less likely to subsequently remarry.  On 
average, continuously married couples have the greatest amount of wealth, more than 
remarried couples, and singles.  Singles experiencing more than one marital disruption 
have the lowest amount of wealth.  Lifetime earnings and current earnings are important 
factors in wealth differences between married and unmarried individuals, but they explain 
only part of the wealth differences between continuously married and remarried men and 
women. 
 Estimation results from models of log wealth with rich controls reveal no wealth 
differences between continuously married couples and individuals remarried after one 
disruption thus our controls, particularly controls for the lower education and higher 
number of children of remarried individuals compared to continuously married 
individuals and controls for other observable differences in lifetime earnings, mortality 
risk and time rate of preference explain the mean and median differences we see.  
However remarried individuals with two or more disruptions have lower wealth than 
continuously married couples, and although this group of individuals is not large (9 
percent of our sample of 51-56 year olds), it has been increasing over time.   
 Single women have wealth levels that are substantially lower than continuously 
married women unexplained by the many observable differences between these groups. 
One explanation (given we are controlling for lifetime earnings, current earnings, 
mortality risk and many other differences) may be that children most often reside with the 
mother when a marriage dissolves and the higher consumption needs of a household with 
children may not be fully compensated by alimony or child support payments thus to 
maintain consumption, the household may reduce savings.  This hypothesis however, 
cannot be explicitly tested using these data.  We explored another potential explanation 
for the large wealth differences of single women compared to married women:  
differences in financial literacy and find that even among college educated individuals, 
financial literacy is the lowest for divorced individuals.  Never married women were 
more likely to answer a financial literacy question correctly than divorced women which 
is consistent with a hypothesis that previously married women may not have invested in 
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understanding complex financial decisions while married.  Finally, we find evidence 
consistent with the hypothesis that married couples enjoy economies of scale in 
consumption and this leads to higher wealth compared to remarried and single 
individuals. Independent of the effect of length of marriage, we also find that for women 
a marital disruption between the ages of 36 and 45 reduced wealth, primarily housing 
wealth at older ages substantially. 
 Our primary measure of wealth (housing and financial) does not include future 
claims on pension and Social Security wealth that may vary by current marital status and 
past events.  Once we include Social Security and pension wealth in our measure of total 
wealth, the mean (and median) wealth differences between married and single individuals 
decrease, particularly for never married singles but inclusion of these measures in our 
model does not change our main substantive findings. 
 Our model explains 26 percent of the variance in wealth across households (29 
percent for the HRS cohort in models with pension and Social Security wealth included).   
Thus, much variance remains to be explained.  If the remaining heterogeneity is 
correlated with marriage, our results may still be biased.  Future work will take advantage 
of the long HRS panel to examine changes in wealth and savings as a result of marriage 
status changes at older ages and utilize panel econometric techniques to control for 
unobserved heterogeneity.   
Finally, we find interesting cohort differences (model based results not shown) 
that merit future study.  For example, in model-based estimation, we find that for the 
Early Baby Boomer cohort remarried men have less wealth (69 percent) than 
continuously married men.  Divorced men and women from this birth cohort have 
between 50 and 100 percent less wealth than continuously married men and women.  
Given the higher divorce rate, higher prevalence of multiple divorces, and earlier age of 
divorce among the Early Baby Boomer cohort compared to earlier cohorts, an 
understanding of how marriage disruptions over the lifecycle impact savings may become 
increasingly important for understanding the economic security of these soon to be retired 




Becker, Gary S.  1981.  A Treatise on the Family.   Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Browning, Martin and Annamaria Lusardi, 1996, “Household Saving:  Micro Theories 
and Micro Facts,” Journal of Economic Literature, XXXIV, pp 1797-1855. 
Cherlin, A. 1992.  Marriage, Divorce and Remarriage.  Cambridge, MA:  Harvard 
University Press. 
Coombs, R.H. (1991). Marital status and personal well-being: A literature review.  
Family Relations, 40, 97-102. 
Dynan, Karen, 1993. “How Prudent are Consumers?” Journal of Political Economy 
101(6): 1104-1113. 
Gove, W.R. (1973). Sex, marital status, and mortality. American Journal of Sociology, 
79, 45-67. 
Gustman, Alan and F. Thomas Juster, 1996, “Income and Wealth of Older American 
Households,” in Eric Hanushek and Nancy Maritato, Assessing Knowledge of 
Retirement Behavior, Washington D.C.:  National Academy Press. 
Haider, Steven and Gary Solon, 2000, “Non-Response Bias in the HRS Social Security 
Files,” RAND DRU-2254-NIA 
Hill, Martha.  1979.  The Wage Effects of Marital Status and Children.  Journal of 
Human Resources 14(4): 579-94. 
House, J.S., Landis, K.R., & Umberson, D. (1988). Social relationships and health. 
Science, 241, 540-545.  
Hubbard, R. Glenn, Jonathan Skinner and Stephen D. Zeldes, 1995, “Precautionary 
Saving and Social Insurance,” Journal of Political Economy, 103 (2), pp. 360-
399. 
Korenman, Sanders and David Neumark.  1991.  Does Marriage Really Make Men More 
Productive?  The Journal of Human Resources 26(2): 282-307. 
Lillard, Lee and Linda Waite.  1995.  Till Death Do Us Part:  Marital Disruption and 
Mortality.  American Journal of Sociology, 100: 1131-1156. 
Loughran,  David and Julie Zissimopoulos. 2007.  Why Wait?  The Effect of Marriage 
and Childbearing on the Wage Growth of Men and Women.  RAND Working 
Paper WR-482. 
Lundberg, Shelly and Elaina Rose.  2002.  The Effects of Sons and Daughters on Men's 
Labor Supply and Wages.  Review of Economics and Statistics 84(2): 251-68. 
Lupton, Joseph and James Smith.  2000.  Marriage Assets and Savings.  Mimeo. 
Lusardi, Annamaria and Olivia Mitchell.  2007.  “Baby Boomer retirement security:  The 
roles of planning, financial literacy and housing wealth.” Journal of Monetary 
Economics 54: 205-224. 
Mincer, Jacob. 1978.  Family Migration Decisions.  Journal of Political Economy 86(5): 
749-773. 
Modigliani, Franco and Brumberg, Richard, 1954, "Utility Analysis and the Consumption 
Function: An Interpretation of Cross-Section Data," in  K. Kurihara, ed., Post-
Keynesian Economics, New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press 
Pienta, A., Hayward, M. D., & Jenkins, K. R. (2000). Health consequences of marriage 
for the retirement years. Journal of Family Issues, 21, 559-586. 
Siegel, J.S. (1993). A generation of change: A profile of America’s older population. 
New York: Russell Sage Foundation. 
 
 23
Smith, James P.  1988.  Poverty and the Family, in Divided Opportunities:  Gary 
Sandefur and Marta Tienda editors, Plenum Publishing Corporation. 
Smith, James P., 1995, “Racial and Ethnic Differences in Wealth,” Journal of Human 
Resources 30: S158-S183. 
Venti, Steven F., and David A. Wise, 1996, “Lifetime Income, Saving Choices, and 
Wealth at Retirement,” presented at the Symposium to Honor of F. Thomas 
Juster, December, Ann Arbor. 
Venti, Steven F. and David A. Wise, 2000, “Choice, Chance and Wealth Dispersion at 
Retirement,” NBER Working Paper #7521. 
Wilmoth, Janet and Gregor Koso.  2002.  Does Marital History Matter?  Marital Status 
and Wealth Outcomes Among Preretirement Adults, Journal of Marriage and 
Family 64: 254-268. 
Zissimopoulos, Julie and Michael Hurd, 2003.  Saving for Retirement:  Wage Growth 
and Unexpected Events.  Manuscript under review. 
 
 24
Table 1—Distribution of Current Marital Status, Number of Divorces, Age of First 
Disruption and Year Married by Cohort For Ages 51-56 
(percent distribution) 
 HRS WB EBB All
Marital Status  
Missing 0.16 0.93 1.23 0.58
Married continuously* 55.53 52.93 45.15 52.41
Remarried* 21.84 20.91 21.80 21.66
Partnered 2.83 3.12 4.22 3.24
Divorced 11.42 14.34 17.54 13.52
Widowed 4.65 3.17 3.30 4.03
Never Married 3.57 4.60 6.76 4.57
Number of Divorces (mean)  0.42 0.48 0.57 0.47
Missing 0.14 1.15 1.91 0.78
0 divorces 66.70 62.23 56.60 63.31
1 divorce 25.89 27.70 29.67 27.19
2+ divorces 7.26 8.92 11.81 8.73
Age at First Disruption (mean) 34.65 32.90 32.14 33.69
No marital disruption 60.02 57.58 51.03 57.28
Missing 1.06 1.97 2.38 1.57
<=25 7.82 9.58 13.13 9.49
26-35 13.68 15.60 17.26 14.94
36-45 11.42 11.66 11.18 11.40
46+ 6.00 3.61 5.01 5.31
Years Married (mean) 28.49 26.13 24.77 27.11
Missing 5.05 4.11 3.98 4.60
<10 7.35 11.77 16.87 10.59
10+ 87.60 84.13 79.16 84.81
N 5550 1827 2514 8251
SOURCE:  Authors’ calculations based on the 1992 (HRS cohort), 1998 (War Babies, WB cohort) and 
2004 (Early Baby Boomers, EBB cohort) HRS. 
NOTE:  Sample is respondents from each cohort ages 51 to 56.  Columns may not add to totals due to 
rounding.  ‘*’ indicates that this category includes separated individuals.  
 
Table 2— Distribution of Marriage Disruption by Current Marital Status For Ages 51-56 
(percent distribution) 
 
 Current Married Current Single 
Missing 0.61 0.47 
No past shock (continuously/never married) 53.18 4.57 
1 divorce  16.31 8.97 
2+ (divorce or widow) 5.62 5.30 
1 widowing 1.66 2.87 
1 unknown disruption  0.44 0.01 
Total 77.82 22.18 
SOURCE:  Authors’ calculations based on the 1992-2004 HRS. 
NOTE:  Sample is 8251 respondents ages 51 to 56.  Cell percentages total 100. 
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Table 3— Mean and Median Wealth by Marriage Categories and 
Cohort For Ages 51-56 
($2004) 
 
 HRS  WBB  EBB  All  
 Median Wealth ($) 
 Married Single Married Single Married Single Married Single 
No past shock  153,671 41,419 170,120 19,963 214,000 33,052 167,522  35,745 
1 divorce  119,368 39,836 114,629 73,661 127,500 44,700 119,200  47,091 
2+ shocks 84,420 29,020 112,488 18,516 107,850 35,000 96,952  31,275 
1 widowing  108,295 39,407 209,873 67,238 96,050 41,250 111,451  46,233 
Total  141,140 38,253 152,761 45,597 180,500 37,300 151,693  39,275 
 Mean Wealth ($) 
 Married Single Married Single Married Single Married Single 
No past shock  337,950 202,953 380,121 104,681 447,794 137,503 370,013  160,074 
1 divorce  278,877 130,393 310,180 202,923 425,296 157,449 324,134  153,450 
2+ shocks 213,412 96,524 368,230 85,170 323,913 127,979 273,731  105,444 
1 widowing  262,738 102,029 367,699 143,953 143,438 244,340 253,890  133,284 
Total 315,726 130,487 364,822 149,825 425,776 150,936 350,476  140,403 
SOURCE:  Authors’ calculations based on the 1992-2004 HRS. 
NOTE:  Sample is 8158 respondents ages 51 to 56.  Excludes 93 respondents with unknown type of marriage 
disruption. 
 
Table 4—Median Wealth by Age of Marital Change, Year Married, Cohort: Ages 51-56 
($2004) 
 
  HRS  WB  EBB  ALL  
Age of First Shock Currently Married 
<=25  101,568  94,897  106,846  102,157  
26-35  112,517  139,684  112,100  117,332  
36-45  127,785  109,363  133,009  125,438  
46+  98,101  183,718  32,400  93,307  
Years Married         
<10  71,201  122,845  83,000  85,798  
10+  148,395  162,019  194,500  161,546  
Age of First Shock Currently Single 
<=25  13,586  13,598  32,400  21,089  
26-35  26,579  39,548  32,500  31,286  
36-45  43,641  76,265  43,000  49,525  
46+  60,188  111,099  77,375  70,565  
Years Married     
<10  14,774  31,304  30,750  25,335  
10+  46,167  72,301  46,500  50,787  
SOURCE:  Authors’ calculations based on the 1992-2004 HRS. 
NOTE:  Sample is 8251 respondents ages 51 to 56.  
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Table 5—Mean Lifetime Earnings and Current Earnings by Marital Categories 
($2004) 
 
 Males Females 
 Mean Lifetime Earnings ($) 
 Married Single Married Single 
No past shock  1,000,943 603,643 303,586 560,647 
1 divorce  977,325 843,083 387,604 462,205 
2+ shocks 861,106 827,071 392,952 444,474 
1 widowing  934,577 706,314 273,472 329,973 
 Current Earnings ($) 
 Married Single Married Single 
No past shock  45,523 24,178 18,181 24,029 
1 divorce  41,979 28,037 20,738 26,699 
2+ shocks 34,977 32,325 20,514 21,618 
1 widowing  35,796 22,157 15,651 15,617 
SOURCE:  Authors’ calculations using SS earnings and1992-2004 HRS. 
NOTE:  Sample is all respondents for current earnings and with matched Social 




Table 6—Models of (Ln) Per Capita Total Wealth, Non-housing Wealth and Housing 
Wealth 
 (1) (2) (3)
 (Ln) Wealth (Ln)Non-House (Ln)Housing 
Marriage Categories  
Continuously married (reference)    
Male currently married - 1 div, 0 wid -0.101 0.003 -0.142 
 (0.118) (0.128) (0.153) 
Male currently married - 0 div, 1 wid 0.130 0.401 0.463 
 (0.299) (0.323) (0.388) 
Male currently married - 2 past events  -0.449 -0.147 -1.161 
 (0.170)** (0.183) (0.220)** 
Male currently single - 0 div, 0 wid (never married) -0.112 -0.268 -0.977 
 (0.247) (0.266) (0.320)** 
Male currently single - 1 div, 0 wid -0.383 -0.183 -1.568 
 (0.206) (0.223) (0.267)** 
Male currently single - 0 div, 1 wid -0.018 -0.416 -0.108 
 (0.381) (0.411) (0.494) 
Male currently single - 2 past events -0.703 -0.481 -2.169 
 (0.224)** (0.242)* (0.290)** 
Female currently married - 1 div, 0 wid -0.132 -0.049 -0.283 
 (0.112) (0.121) (0.145) 
Female currently married - 0 div, 1 wid -0.235 -0.206 -0.543 
 (0.231) (0.249) (0.299) 
Female currently married - 2 past events  -0.171 -0.056 -0.503 
 (0.168) (0.181) (0.217)* 
Female currently single - 0 div, 0 wid (never married) -1.350 -1.416 -2.085 
 (0.230)** (0.248)** (0.298)** 
Female currently single - 1 div, 0 wid -0.901 -1.383 -1.445 
 (0.168)** (0.181)** (0.217)** 
Female currently single - 0 div, 1 wid -0.682 -1.342 -0.748 
 (0.205)** (0.221)** (0.265)** 
Female currently single - 2 past events  -1.120 -1.442 -1.883 
 (0.168)** (0.181)** (0.217)** 
Marriage Years and Age of First Disruption    
Male total years spent in married state 0.040 0.032 0.057 
 (0.005)** (0.006)** (0.007)** 
Female total years spent in married state 0.043 0.037 0.053 
 (0.005)** (0.005)** (0.006)** 
Male age at first separation <26 -0.020 -0.196 0.267 
 (0.166) (0.179) (0.214) 
Male age at first separation 36-45 -0.064 0.057 -0.161 
 (0.144) (0.155) (0.187) 
Male age at first separation >45 -0.319 -0.269 -1.023 
 (0.195) (0.210) (0.252)** 
Female age at first separation <26 -0.181 0.054 -0.190 
 (0.127) (0.137) (0.164) 
Female age at first separation 36-45 -0.365 -0.225 -0.366 
 (0.133)** (0.143) (0.172)* 
Female age at first separation >45 -0.041 -0.057 -0.122 




Table 6 cont.—Models of (Ln) Per Capita Total Wealth, Non-housing Wealth and 
Housing Wealth 
 (Ln) Wealth (Ln)Non-House (Ln)Housing
Demographic and Household Characteristics  
Male age -0.368 -0.385 -0.339 
 (0.063)** (0.068)** (0.081)** 
Male age squared 0.004 0.004 0.004 
 (0.001)** (0.001)** (0.001)** 
Female age  -0.198 -0.220 -0.090 
 (0.063)** (0.068)** (0.082) 
Female age squared 0.002 0.003 0.001 
 (0.001)** (0.001)** (0.001) 
Male education less than high school -0.976 -1.291 -0.912 
 (0.101)** (0.109)** (0.131)** 
Male education high school graduate (ref.)    
Male education some college 0.302 0.360 0.207 
 (0.098)** (0.105)** (0.127) 
Male education college plus 1.091 1.313 0.884 
 (0.099)** (0.107)** (0.128)** 
Female education less than high school -1.412 -1.479 -1.416 
 (0.088)** (0.095)** (0.114)** 
Female education high school graduate (ref.)    
Female education some college 0.501 0.673 0.392 
 (0.084)** (0.090)** (0.108)** 
Female education college plus 1.064 1.444 0.962 
 (0.094)** (0.102)** (0.122)** 
Race is black -1.809 -1.958 -1.634 
 (0.067)** (0.072)** (0.086)** 
Race is other -0.872 -1.094 -1.153 
 (0.104)** (0.112)** (0.135)** 
Has no children 0.126 0.165 -0.181 
 (0.102) (0.110) (0.132) 
Has 1-3 children (ref.)    
Has 4+ children -0.265 -0.513 -0.246 
 (0.054)** (0.058)** (0.070)** 
Mortality Risk    
Male 0% probability of living to age 75 -0.818 -1.135 -0.360 
 (0.152)** (0.164)** (0.197) 
Male 1-49% probability of living to age 75 -0.331 -0.279 -0.084 
 (0.119)** (0.128)* (0.154) 
Male 50% probability of living to age 75 -0.072 -0.224 -0.032 
 (0.101) (0.109)* (0.131) 
Male 51-99% probability of living to age 75 (ref.)    
Male 100% probability of living to age 75 -0.059 -0.105 -0.200 
 (0.108) (0.116) (0.140) 
Female 0% probability of living to age 75 -0.936 -1.415 -0.685 
 (0.145)** (0.157)** (0.188)** 
Female 1-49% probability of living to age 75 -0.397 -0.612 -0.201 
 (0.108)** (0.116)** (0.140) 
Female 50% probability of living to age 75 -0.098 -0.026 -0.055 
 (0.086) (0.093) (0.112) 
Female 51-99% probability of living to age 75 (ref.)    
Female 100% probability of living to age 75 0.090 0.062 0.075 




Table 6 cont.—Models of (Ln) Per Capita Total Wealth, Non-housing Wealth and 
Housing Wealth 
 (Ln) Wealth (Ln)Non-House (Ln)Housing
Risk Aversion  
Male least risk averse -0.294 -0.193 -0.565 
 (0.109)** (0.117) (0.141)** 
Male 3rd most risk averse -0.072 -0.145 -0.248 
 (0.124) (0.134) (0.161) 
Male 2nd most risk averse -0.016 -0.091 -0.020 
 (0.113) (0.122) (0.146) 
Male most risk averse (reference)    
Female least risk averse 0.147 0.121 0.045 
 (0.102) (0.110) (0.132) 
Female 3rd most risk averse 0.082 -0.013 0.142 
 (0.108) (0.117) (0.140) 
Female 2nd most risk averse 0.146 0.267 0.149 
 (0.096) (0.104)* (0.124) 
Female most risk averse (reference)    
Financial Planning Horizon    
Male <5yr financial planning horizon (reference)    
Male 5-10yr financial planning horizon 0.478 0.534 0.576 
 (0.084)** (0.090)** (0.108)** 
Male >10yr financial planning horizon 0.356 0.410 0.448 
 (0.121)** (0.131)** (0.157)** 
Female <5yr financial planning horizon (reference)    
Female 5-10yr financial planning horizon 0.312 0.439 0.408 
 (0.074)** (0.079)** (0.095)** 
Female >10yr financial planning horizon 0.453 0.542 0.414 
 (0.106)** (0.114)** (0.137)** 
Earnings     
Male (ln) lifetime earnings  0.404 0.393 0.526 
 (0.040)** (0.043)** (0.052)** 
Female (ln) lifetime earnings  0.112 0.115 0.100 
 (0.017)** (0.019)** (0.023)** 
Male log of current earn - 2004$ 0.034 0.050 0.010 
 (0.009)** (0.010)** (0.012) 
Female log of current earn - 2004$ 0.041 0.041 0.023 
 (0.008)** (0.008)** (0.010)* 
Pension     
Defined benefit only household pensions 0.648 0.504 0.958 
 (0.070)** (0.075)** (0.090)** 
Defined contribution only household pensions 0.598 0.622 0.843 
 (0.071)** (0.076)** (0.092)** 
Both types of household pensions 0.748 0.783 1.333 
 (0.070)** (0.076)** (0.091)** 
No pension (reference)    
Constant 11.850 11.286 6.927 
  (1.575)** (1.698)** (2.039)** 
Observations 17198 17198 17198
R-squared 0.26 0.28 0.22 
SOURCE:  Authors’ calculations based on the 1992-2004 HRS. 
NOTE:  Sample is all respondents.  Standard errors given in parentheses. ‘*’ indicates significant at 5%, ‘**’ 
indicates significant at 1%.  Includes missing indicators for marriage categories when type of shock is 
unknown, other missing data indicators, cohort indicators.  Per capita total wealth is based on assumption of 
two people for couples and one person for singles. 
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Table 7—Mean Social Security, Pension, Financial and Housing Wealth by 
Marriage Histories For Males and Females – HRS Cohort 
($2004) 
 
 Males Females 
 Mean Social Security Wealth at Age 62 ($) 
 Married Single Married Single 
No past shock  205,902 96,773 207,429 85,182 
1 divorce  206,790 112,649 205,862 81,537 
2+ shocks 197,520 112,461 203,704 78,045 
1 widowing  199,312 97,438 198,772 67,289 
 Mean Pension Wealth at Age 62 ($) 
 Married Single Married Single 
No past shock  257,047 161,410 92,378 159,830 
1 divorce  243,908 200,915 141,437 127,998 
2+ shocks 231,485 247,169 115,164 96,860 
1 widowing  273,915 166,181 85,819 83,236 
 Mean Housing and Financial Wealth ($) 
 Married Single Married Single 
No past shock   350,628  267,090  341,279  84,913  
1 divorce   273,115  167,190  284,112  101,631  
2+ shocks  198,630  163,978  212,754  102,543  
1 widowing   337,453  153,407  229,183  133,907  
SOURCE:  Authors’ calculations based on 1992 restricted Social Security 
earnings data, restricted pension data and the 1992 public release HRS. 
NOTE:  Sample is HRS birth cohort with non-missing data.   
 
Table 8—Financial Literacy by Current Marital Status and Gender for College Graduates 
(percent) 
 
 Males Females 
 % Correct N % Correct N 
Married continuously 37.6 237 21.6 231 
Remarried 34.1 85 15.8 76 
Divorced 22.6 31 14.1 78 
Never Married 22.6 31 22.7 22 
SOURCE:  Authors’ calculations based on wave 2004 HRS. 
NOTE:  Sample is all EBB respondents that responded correctly to at least one of the earlier two financial literacy 
questions. Percent correct is in response to question “Let’s say you have 200 dollars in a savings account. 
The account earns 10% interest per year. How much would you have in the account at the end of two 
years?”  Results for widows and partners not show due to small sample sizes.
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Appendix Table—Frequency of Model Covariates by Marital Categories-Males 
(percent distribution) 
 
 Married Single All 
 0 shocks 1 div 2+shock 1 wid 0 shock 1 div 2+shock 1 wid ALL 
MALES % % % % % % % % % 
EDUCATION          
Less than HS 21.07 20.06 21.34 22.88 24.05 19.21 20.25 26.58 20.97 
HS/GED 32.51 33.03 34.05 40.68 26.46 35.22 36.29 35.44 32.90 
Some College 19.92 25.54 28.45 16.10 20.62 23.89 29.11 30.38 22.15 
College+ 26.49 21.37 16.16 20.34 28.87 21.67 14.35 7.59 23.98 
LIVE 75          
.D.M.R.S 13.33 10.90 8.62 11.86 7.56 3.20 3.38 5.06 11.34 
0 5.95 6.80 7.54 8.47 8.93 9.11 13.50 13.92 6.88 
1-49 11.90 12.21 12.50 17.80 13.75 14.29 16.03 18.99 12.51 
50 20.22 18.53 19.61 14.41 26.46 25.62 22.36 17.72 20.34 
51-99 32.97 33.66 31.90 24.58 28.87 31.53 24.05 30.38 32.35 
100 15.63 17.90 19.83 22.88 14.43 16.26 20.68 13.92 16.59 
RISK AVERSE          
.D.M.R.S 13.17 10.96 7.97 12.71 5.50 3.94 3.38 3.80 11.18 
1.Lowest 12.54 13.32 13.15 8.47 15.12 20.94 18.99 15.19 13.47 
2 8.88 10.55 11.21 11.86 12.03 7.14 10.55 10.13 9.49 
3 12.17 11.52 12.50 9.32 14.43 12.56 14.35 6.33 12.14 
4.Highest 53.24 53.64 55.17 57.63 52.92 55.42 52.74 64.56 53.72 
PLANNING          
.D.M.R.S 13.42 10.83 8.84 14.41 8.25 2.71 5.06 6.33 11.50 
1. Next few mo. 11.64 13.12 14.87 13.56 21.99 22.17 23.63 24.05 13.67 
2. Next year 7.68 8.19 7.97 5.93 12.37 10.59 10.97 17.72 8.33 
3. Next few yrs. 25.85 23.53 23.92 26.27 24.74 23.89 24.47 25.32 25.08 
4. 5-10 years 30.83 33.24 32.97 28.81 21.65 30.30 27.85 20.25 30.80 
5. 10+ years 10.58 11.10 11.42 11.02 11.00 10.34 8.02 6.33 10.62 
RACE          
1.White 80.84 79.53 82.76 79.66 71.82 73.65 80.17 56.96 79.66 
2.Black 12.96 15.48 12.50 14.41 24.05 22.66 14.77 39.24 14.76 
3.Other 6.20 5.00 4.74 5.93 4.12 3.69 5.06 3.80 5.59 
CHILDREN (#)          
M 0.30 0.83 1.29 0.85 1.37 1.23 3.38 0.00 0.66 
0 6.29 5.14 4.96 8.47 84.19 14.04 7.59 13.92 9.64 
1-3 66.98 46.08 35.78 33.90 12.37 65.02 66.67 60.76 58.06 
4+ 26.42 47.95 57.97 56.78 2.06 19.70 22.36 25.32 31.63 
PENSION          
.D.M.R.S 0.39 0.42 0.22 0.00 1.03 0.74 2.53 0.00 0.49 
No Pension 38.30 36.85 47.41 36.44 63.92 62.56 63.71 74.68 42.11 
DB only 19.32 17.83 15.95 22.88 13.75 13.30 11.39 12.66 18.00 
DC only 18.17 20.61 16.16 15.25 11.34 12.07 12.24 5.06 17.54 
DB + DC 23.82 24.29 20.26 25.42 9.97 11.33 10.13 7.59 21.86 




Appendix Table Cont.—Frequency of Model Covariates by Marital Categories-Females 
(percent distribution) 
 
 Married Single All 
 0 shocks 1 div 2+shock 1 wid 0 shock 1 div 2+shock 1 wid  
FEMALE          
EDUCATION          
Less than HS 20.50 17.85 24.04 31.22 26.01 18.11 27.60 38.29 21.80 
HS/GED 39.21 39.24 35.96 41.46 32.08 35.48 35.73 32.59 38.00 
Some College 21.44 27.34 26.60 20.00 19.36 24.19 23.63 16.70 22.59 
College+ 18.85 15.57 13.40 7.32 22.54 22.21 13.04 12.42 17.61 
LIVE 75          
.D.M.R.S 6.09 5.26 2.77 4.88 8.67 5.09 3.78 4.28 5.56 
0 4.84 4.64 7.66 6.34 5.78 6.82 9.07 5.70 5.46 
1-49 10.51 11.28 11.70 10.73 10.40 10.67 11.34 13.24 10.89 
50 20.21 19.45 22.55 20.49 19.08 19.35 19.47 22.00 20.15 
51-99 39.48 36.12 37.87 36.10 36.42 34.74 32.51 34.62 37.68 
100 18.87 23.25 17.45 21.46 19.65 23.33 23.82 20.16 20.26 
RISK AVERSE          
.D.M.R.S 6.67 5.12 3.83 4.88 6.94 4.34 5.10 5.50 5.93 
1. Lowest 9.93 11.21 14.26 9.27 12.14 12.53 12.67 12.42 10.90 
2 9.93 9.20 5.32 5.85 9.25 12.16 8.32 9.16 9.54 
3 12.57 14.39 16.60 10.24 10.40 12.28 11.53 8.55 12.63 
4. Highest 60.90 60.07 60.00 69.76 61.27 58.68 62.38 64.36 61.01 
PLANNING          
.D.M.R.S 6.35 5.26 3.83 5.85 7.23 4.34 3.78 5.91 5.75 
1. Next few mo. 15.13 18.62 18.09 23.41 23.99 24.94 23.44 24.03 18.04 
2. Next year 9.89 8.44 10.21 10.73 10.12 6.95 10.78 11.81 9.61 
3. Next few yrs. 29.27 27.82 27.45 27.32 24.86 25.43 27.41 27.70 28.25 
4. 5-10 years 28.91 29.27 29.15 23.41 22.83 26.80 25.33 21.59 27.89 
5. 10+ years 10.46 10.59 11.28 9.27 10.98 11.54 9.26 8.96 10.46 
RACE          
1.White 80.39 80.55 86.81 77.56 49.71 64.64 69.57 59.06 76.55 
2.Black 13.52 15.50 8.72 18.54 42.20 29.78 24.01 35.23 17.79 
3.Other 6.09 3.94 4.47 3.90 8.09 5.58 6.43 5.70 5.67 
CHILDREN (#)          
M 0.28 0.55 0.43 1.46 0.58 0.50 1.13 0.61 0.45 
0 3.74 2.91 3.40 2.44 56.65 10.17 6.43 5.91 6.28 
1-3 65.82 45.26 34.04 40.98 33.24 64.76 60.49 56.62 58.60 
4+ 30.16 51.28 62.13 55.12 9.54 24.57 31.95 36.86 34.67 
PENSION          
.D.M.R.S 0.34 0.48 0.21 0.49 2.31 1.61 1.70 1.63 0.68 
No Pension 42.18 43.94 51.49 55.12 58.96 55.46 61.25 68.64 47.31 
DB only 18.36 18.27 14.89 12.68 15.61 17.37 12.29 11.61 17.19 
DC only 17.13 16.75 14.47 17.07 10.40 15.63 18.53 12.02 16.39 
DB + DC 21.99 20.55 18.94 14.63 12.72 9.93 6.24 6.11 18.43 
No. Obs. 5289 1445 470 205 346 806 529 491 9581 
 
